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Political Economy of Fiscal Reform in Central
and Eastern Europe
The reform of public finances has been at the centre of the post-socialist transition of Central and Eastern 
Europe since the early 1990s. At various stages of the transition, the reform process encompassed the 
entire gamut of public finances: the national budget, sub-national finances, extrabudgetary operations, 
and state-owned financial and non-financial enterprises. For the most part, fiscal reform was a non-linear 
stop-and-go process – often characterised by backtracking as well – and was uneven across countries. 
Moreover, unlike most reform experience in the rest of the world, fiscal reform in this region took place 
against the backdrop of a radical break, as sovereign countries emerged from a colonial past following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. An important milestone was reached in 2004–2007, when all ten countries1 
covered in this article became members of the European Union. The purpose of this article is to discuss fiscal 
reform in Central and Eastern Europe from the perspective of political economy. Following an overview of 
basic reform trends, the article focuses on the principal drivers and impediments to reform in the region. 
To conclude, the ingredients of successful reform are examined. The article does not provide an exhaustive 
inventory of reform measures, nor does it offer a survey of broad political economy issues prior to or during 
the transition period.2 Country references are intended to serve as stylised illustrations of main points, 
rather than as a comprehensive documentation of reform episodes.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) classifications: H1, H3, P2, P52.
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rough the end of the 1980s, the scal system of Central and Eastern European countries was 
cast in a socialist centrally planned regime. e system was characterised by the subsidised 
provision of merit goods and services through state-owned enterprises, operating under a 
so budget constraint. e subsidies as well as large investment projects (mostly prestige 
projects) were nanced largely with highly opaque and non-parametric levies which, in 
turn, were determined by price and wage controls. All key policy decisions emanated 
from the central plan. With the fall of the Iron Curtain, these countries abandoned central 
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reflect those of the Fiscal Council.
1 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia.
2 For a discussion of such issues under socialist central planning, see Kornai (1992), and under post-socialist transition, 
see Roland (2000), Kolodko (2000), and Csaba (2005).
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planning and embarked on an unprecedented market-oriented transition, with a view to 
eventually joining the European Union.3
e initial conditions and the pace of transition diered across countries in various areas, 
most notably in the reform of public nances. Hungary, Poland and the former Yugoslavia 
had already launched limited reform initiatives in the previous decades and were best 
prepared for the transition. By contrast, without any prior reform measures, the former 
German Democratic Republic moved almost instantaneously from the most rigid central 
planning to full unication with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).
Given more advanced initial conditions, Hungary and Poland took the lead in liberalising 
prices, wages, interest rates and external trade. Alternative routes to privatisation were 
chosen, between formal mass privatisation in Czechoslovakia and a pragmatic yet eective 
case-by-case or sectoral approach – laced with insider trading behaviour – in Hungary, 
Poland and Slovenia. In addition, in the case of Hungary, enforcement of the strictest 
bankruptcy legislation helped restore an arm’s-length relation between government nances 
and the enterprise sector. Except for the early introduction of the value-added tax (VAT) 
and income taxes in Hungary, tax reform and phase-out of price subsidies were much more 
gradual than anticipated in most countries. However, in the Baltics, the reform process 
gained momentum on all fronts in the second half of the 1990s, placing this group ahead of 
the rest. By the end of the 1990s, transition in the scal area had reached a critical mass in 
Central Europe (CE) and the Baltic countries.4
Perhaps the slowest area of reform was the social security system, encompassing public 
pensions, health care, unemployment insurance and social assistance. With strong World 
Bank prodding, most countries (except the Czech Republic) introduced a government-
mandated private dened-contribution pension scheme, though without adjusting the 
parameters of the traditional dened-benet scheme and neglecting the budgetary costs of 
transition to the new scheme.
e reform of the public administration, including rationalisation of the government 
work-force, was also relatively slow. e practically unchanged size of government 
employment in several CE countries can be explained in part by the dierent depth of 
the transition in the tradable versus the non-tradable sectors. e tradable sector, fully 
exposed to foreign competition, bore the brunt of a severe transformational contraction 
and attendant unemployment. Meanwhile, the non-tradable sector, including the public 
administration, remained protected and was hardly forced to shed any employees.
Broadly speaking, by the time of EU accession, most countries had completed the 
market-oriented transition, and the structure of their public nances is now comparable 
to that in most European economies (see Kopits 2006). Yet important dierences prevailed 
between the Baltics and the CE members concerning government size, scal balance and 
public debt sustainability. Whereas in the Baltics, as well as in the Slovak Republic, general 
government outlays total less than 40% of GDP, in the other countries they are close to 
the EU average of nearly 50% of GDP. e government wage bill as a ratio to GDP and 
the share of public employees in total employment in Hungary, Poland and Slovenia are 
3 See Kopits (1991) for an early assessment of fiscal reform in Central and Eastern Europe. Other contributions on specific 
issues and countries can be found in Tanzi (1993) and in Kopits (1994a, 1994b, 1994c).
4 See Tanzi and Tsibouris (2000) for an overview of fiscal reform in all transition economies in the 1990s.
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high by OECD standards. Overall, the larger CE economies stand out for their structural 
weaknesses and long-term sustainability problem.5
Tax rates are lower and more uniform and spending programmes are more modest in 
the Baltics than in the larger CE countries. e tax system of the latter, unlike that of the 
Baltics, is plagued by relatively narrow and distorted tax bases and high marginal rates. 
Eective tax bases have been eroded by administrative shortcomings and proliferation of 
tax preferences. In recent years, the Baltics, Romania and the Slovak Republic took a bold 
step that generated considerable international attention, with the adoption of at taxes on 
personal income at a low uniform rate that was extended to the VAT and company income 
taxation as well.
A number of expenditure-related problems remain, especially in the major CE countries: 
excessive public payroll, dysfunctional application of social security programmes, 
inadequate targeting of social assistance, and overall lack of cost-consciousness in the 
provision and consumption of public resources – problems that are compounded by 
considerable programme rigidities. In addition, budget procedures are far less eective 
than in the Baltics.6
In the CE countries, easy eligibility for disability and early retirement pensions, and for 
sickness benets, is seen as a means of soaking up structural unemployment. Among OECD 
countries, Poland stands out with the highest proportion of the working-age population 
claiming disability pension benets, by a wide margin. Family benets and education 
are freely available in these countries regardless of household income or wealth. High 
consumption of pharmaceuticals in CE countries is induced by generous subsidisation; the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and the Slovak Republic rank among the OECD countries with 
the highest proportion of pharmaceuticals in total health-care expenditures.
Given insucient revenue, as well as structural distortions and rigidities in expenditure, 
the larger CE countries have been experiencing scal stress since prior to EU accession, 
manifest in signicant imbalances. is condition has been exacerbated by the rst-round 
scal costs of EU accession7 – reecting additional expenditure needs and revenue erosion 
due to increased scope for tax arbitrage – which are yet to be fully absorbed by the new 
members. With budget decits in excess of 3% of GDP, the three largest new members have 
been subject to the excessive decit procedure, pursuant to the EU Stability and Growth 
Pact. By contrast, in the Baltic countries and in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia, general 
government accounts have been nearly in balance or in surplus.
From early on in the transition, the views of economists have converged as to the 
guiding principles of scal reform in the post-socialist transition. First, scal policy should 
encourage ecient resource allocation in the product, capital and labour markets – albeit 
with government intervention warranted in the event of market failure. Second, the structure 
of public nances – notably social security programmes – should be sustainable over time 
– that is, consistent with the intertemporal budget constraint. ird, scal institutions 
should promote social fairness in accordance with the collective value judgment prevailing 
in each country, but without prejudice to economic goals. Finally, the conduct of government 
5 See the public debt projections in Deroose, Montanino and Wold (2006).
6 Applying a numerical scoring, Gleich and von Hagen (2003) found that the CE countries lag significantly behind the 
Baltics as regards the quality of fiscal institutions, degree of transparency and degree of centralisation.
7 According to estimates in Kopits and Székely (2003), the direct net fiscal effect of accession may surpass 4% of GDP 
yearly over the medium term.
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(budget process, procurement practices, tax administration, etc.) should be eective and 
should follow criteria of good governance (including codes of transparency and conict of 
interest) in conformity with internationally agreed standards of good practice.
From broad agreement on these dening principles, it is rather straightforward to derive 
technical design features of scal reform. Hence, the question remains as to why the paths 
to reform have diverged among countries. For each individual country, a partial answer lies 
in cultural and historical antecedents and characteristics, which explain preferences with 
respect to a large versus a small public sector, pay-as-you-go versus a funded public pension 
system, high versus low tax rates, and so on. However, we can identify political-economy 
reasons in terms of drivers and impediments to reform, at a more general level, applicable 
in principle to all these economies. e rest of this article shall examine the role of these 
positive and negative forces.
Drivers of Reform
e reform of public nances in Central and Eastern Europe has been driven by widespread 
regime change, eruption of nancial crises and the presence of an external anchor. ese 
three drivers are manifest at varying degrees of intensity in dierent countries and in 
dierent time periods.
Regime Change
Perhaps the most obvious and powerful reform driver, present to a varying extent in all 
transition economies, has been the move from socialist central planning to a market-
based economy. As noted, nowhere was the reform eort more intense than in the former 
German Democratic Republic, where economic life was immediately aected by the 
wholesale adoption of institutions of the FRG. With some exceptions, further east and 
south the impact of regime change was slower. For a while in Bulgaria, Romania and the 
Slovak Republic, the political leadership remained under the control of former ocials of 
the socialist regime.
In essence, regime change involved the introduction of market signals through three 
overlapping and mutually reinforcing channels. e rst consisted of the liberalisation of 
prices, wages and interest rates. e second subjected enterprises to a hard budget constraint 
and the risk of bankruptcy, including through the privatisation of state-owned enterprises. 
And third, the economy was opened to the rest of the world by dismantling barriers to 
international trade and investment. With an early start, Hungary and Poland were the rst 
countries to allow market forces to prevail through these channels.
On the scal front, these changes had major implications for the budget expenditures 
and revenues and for the structure of the public sector. Price liberalisation and the opening 
of the economy were accomplished through widespread deregulation, as well as through the 
elimination of domestic price subsidies, export subsidies and import taris. Arm’s-length 
treatment of the enterprise sector entailed reduced budgetary transfers, while application of 
a transparent and parametric tax structure, along with privatisation (except for the Czech-
type mass privatisation), provided a welcome revenue boost.
However, not all transition economies beneted from the opportunity of an initial 
“honeymoon” eect – oen associated with the shi from an authoritarian to a democratic 
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regime – aorded by the regime change to implement scal reforms.8 Some undertook 
price and external liberalisation at a much slower pace. In other cases, continued state 
ownership of the banking system led to the accumulation of non-performing and inter-
enterprise credits, imposing a heavy drain on the government budget. Furthermore, even 
in progressive transition economies, the non-tradable sector was le largely untouched by 
the regime change and by reform measures. In Hungary, for example, in contrast to massive 
layos in the tradable enterprise sector, the size of the civil service barely changed (at nearly 
one million employees) for at least a decade (see Kopits 2000).
Financial Crisis
In many advanced and developing countries alike, debt crises, currency crises and banking 
crises can provide a major impulse to the reform process. Transition economies were no 
exception. In 1997, the Czech Republic suered simultaneously both a currency attack 
and a bank run in the wake of the Asian crisis. Similar, but more violent, was the debt, 
banking and foreign exchange crisis, along with a political crisis, experienced a year later 
by Bulgaria.
e upshot in the Czech Republic was a new round of eective privatisation (as distinct 
from formal mass privatisation) and bank restructuring, including encouragement of 
strategic investors from abroad. In Bulgaria, the crises led to the overhaul of social transfers 
and of the tax structure; in addition, and perhaps more important, the government assumed 
a commitment to a balanced-budget rule to restore scal sustainability.
e threat of a nancial crisis, in Poland in 1990 and in Hungary in 1995 and 2006, 
prompted the authorities to undertake scal adjustment-cum-reform programmes to 
avert potential debt and currency crises. is action included tax increases, investment 
expenditure cuts, attempts at trimming of social transfers, and eventual adoption of a 
mandatory funded pension scheme alongside the traditional pay-as-you-go public pension 
system. In Hungary, recent steps to overhaul the public health-care system and a proposal 
to establish a rules-based scal responsibility framework are intended to reverse a sharp 
rise in the ratio of public debt to GDP.
External Anchor
From the early 1990s, a number of transition economies declared their intention, rst, 
to join NATO, OECD and WTO (formerly GATT), then to seek membership in the EU 
and, more recently, to participate in the euro area. While some of these countries were 
single-minded in the pursuit of these goals, others have been far less committed. e Baltics 
anchored all macroeconomic policies (dominated by a hard exchange rate peg), including 
the public nances, to these objectives. In these countries, political parties and interest 
groups coalesced behind the goal of joining Western European-based institutions as soon 
as feasible, presumably motivated by geopolitical, historical and cultural reasons in addition 
to the obvious economic ones.
8 Such a honeymoon effect endows leaders with enlarged powers to implement reforms, as observed by Haggard and 
Kaufman (1989) in newly democratic regimes in Asia and Latin America in the 1980s.
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In the scal area, this eort translated into a set of reforms that encompassed state-of-the-
art budgetary procedures, a sustainable social security system and an ecient tax structure. 
In addition, economic fundamentals were aligned to meet the Maastricht requirements 
for adopting the euro at an early stage in the EU membership – in stark contrast with the 
scal performance of the CE countries.9 Since independence, the Baltics balanced their 
public accounts while maintaining a textbook-like countercyclical stance. Estonia stands 
out in this respect: successive governments have adhered to an implicit balanced-budget 
rule, though with recourse to a macroeconomic stabilisation fund. During upswings in 
economic activity, surpluses are earmarked for the fund; during downswings, decits are 
nanced by drawing down reserves in the fund. us, in 1998/99, the Baltics managed to 
dampen the adverse impact of the Russian nancial crisis by running large scal decits, 
followed by signicant surpluses in subsequent years.
More recently, with a view to complying with the Maastricht scal criteria, the Slovak 
Republic adopted an ambitious reform-cum-adjustment programme. Against a background 
of missed opportunities and virtual stagnation, in 2002-06 the centre-right government 
trimmed welfare transfers, reformed the pension programme, and introduced a at tax that 
has become a model for other countries. Interestingly, the successor centre-le government 
preserved the structural reforms and scal discipline, so as to prepare for quick adoption 
of the euro.
Slovenia can also be seen as having anchored scal performance to adoption of the 
euro, which materialised in January 2007. Indeed, in Central Europe, Slovenia was the only 
member country of the EU that was exempt from the excessive decit procedure. However, 
Slovenia’s approach, in both monetary and scal policies, has been far more pragmatic and 
less reliant on reform than the Baltic members or the Slovak Republic. With full participation 
in the euro area, it is an open question whether the Stability and Growth Pact will provide 
sucient incentive to Slovenia for undertaking pending reform measures.
Obstacles to Reform
Slow progress in scal reform, including stop-and-go measures, can be attributed primarily 
to political-economy factors. In particular, major barriers to reforming social security 
programmes, subsidy schemes and taxation are: a widespread dependency syndrome, a 
common-pool problem, a political zero-sum game, and widespread aversion to change. 
Although these impediments can be found in all post-socialist economies, they are more 
acute in some countries than in others.
Dependency Syndrome
A major impediment to scal reform stems from the dependency culture inherited from 
the former socialist regime. e party-state encouraged households to feel dependent on 
the state – mainly through the state-owned enterprises that employed them – blunting 
the desire for freedom, personal initiative and responsibility. e dependency syndrome 
and the associated yearning for security that prevail particularly in the aged strata of the 
population can be viewed as an explanation for ongoing resistance to scal reform in the 
9 For an analysis of the underlying reasons, including the political-economy ones, see Berger, Kopits and Székely (2007).
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region. In eect, the dependency culture is analogous to the attachment to droits acquis
entrenched in the welfare-state tradition in much of Western Europe.
In an exploitation of the dependency syndrome, politicians of various stripes tend to 
cater to interest groups by promising and delivering enhanced social benets, besides 
protection of existing benets. Such populist (or clientelist) competition has been practiced 
not only by traditional leist or le-leaning parties, but also by right-wing parties – in some 
instances, alloyed with patriotic slogans. Although the dependency culture is stronger as we 
look further east, it is also widespread in Central Europe.
Common-pool Problem
An additional political-economy impediment – namely, the common-pool problem (also 
known as commons problem) – is rooted in interest-group dynamics underlying the 
political process. Simply put, major interest groups (teachers’ unions, health-care employees, 
farmers, multinational rms, etc.) that benet from the status quo are well represented 
within the government. By mobilising public opinion, they can eectively block any steps 
that would serve to dismantle existing privileges, in utter disregard of the budget constraint 
faced by the government.10 ese groups are usually most inuential within a coalition 
government or a government that commands a slim majority and/or suers a signicant 
erosion in popularity.
ese conditions are found more oen in the larger CE countries. By contrast, they tend 
to be less pronounced or absent in the Baltics where macroeconomic policies are subject 
to an external anchor, and in Bulgaria following a severe nancial crisis. In these countries, 
as the political elite and society are sensitised to the aggregate budget constraint, interest 
groups subordinate their rent-seeking activity to the macroeconomic stability goal and give 
way to key reform measures.
Zero-sum Game
Although less prevalent than the other impediments, scal reform can be derailed or 
brought to a halt in a highly polarised political environment where the government and the 
opposition are in virtual deadlock. In such a situation, each side believes that any reform 
measure that may politically benet the other side can only be inimical to its own interests. 
Clearly, such a non-cooperative game can confer short-term advantage to one political 
party, but over time at a high cost in terms of forgone benets for all. In fact, a zero-sum 
game rejects outcomes that are proven to lead to a win-win situation over the medium to 
long term.
Although political confrontation is not unknown in some Mediterranean countries, 
it can be far more intense in post-socialist countries. Regrettably, at present this situation 
seems to prevail, for example, in Hungary over a wide range of pending reform tasks in the 
areas of public pensions, health care, education nance, local governments and taxation. A 
proposed scal responsibility framework (requiring legislative enactment by a two-thirds 
majority) is the latest victim of political deadlock.
10 This attitude was immortalised in the definition of tax reform by the late United States Senator Russell Long: “Don’t tax 
you, don’t tax me, tax the fellow behind the tree.”
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Resistance to Change
An almost universal impediment to reform is the inherent resistance to change that is 
particularly strong in ageing societies, characterised by strong risk aversion. Fear of change 
– closely related to the dependency syndrome – can be dissolved by a “tipping point” 
resulting from the dominance of the enumerated reform drivers.11 Resistance to change, 
especially in the mid-age to old-age population, may explain in part the compromise reached 
of preserving the meagre traditional dened-benet pension system for older retirees while 
adopting the new dened-contribution scheme for new entrants in the labour force.
Apart from the fear of various interest groups in losing privileges inherited from the 
socialist regime, resistance to reform is rationalised and defended by a highly educated 
intellectual elite, without necessarily any party aliation or rent seeking. is elite, in some 
cases appealing to social or national consciousness – ready to charge, for example, against 
multinational rms – is both eloquent and respected in these countries.
The Ingredients of Successful Reform
Apart from awareness as to the major drivers and impediments to scal reform that are present 
in various forms or intensity across post-socialist countries, a practical question emerges: 
how to catalyse reform? Or, stated dierently: what are the key ingredients of a successful 
reform eort? On the basis of worldwide experience with scal reform, conrmed for the 
most part in post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe, three indispensable ingredients can 
be listed: design, consensus and communication. On the whole, these features characterise 
scal reform in the Baltics more than in the rest of the region.
First, scal reform must be technically well designed in terms of internal consistency, 
comprehensiveness and sequencing. is precludes a piecemeal or stop-and-go approach 
that can create confusion and lead to a protracted process, and ultimately may undermine 
support for the reform programme because of reform fatigue. In sum, a coherent strategy 
has a far better chance of success than a set of poorly co-ordinated measures.
Second, it is essential that the government take every opportunity to build consensus 
around the set of proposed reform measures. In many respects, this is not merely a technical 
matter, but rather a culture-specic exercise. It entails bringing together diverse groups in 
civil society as participants in such a way that all should feel a stake in the outcome, yet be 
ready to accept some sacrice for the common good.12 A sense of fairness in the measures 
is part of this approach. Contractual obligations (even implicit ones) should be respected 
through minimum grandfathering of acquired rights. Unnecessary confrontation should 
be avoided at all cost.
And third, reform proposals, however obvious they might be for experts in the eld, 
should be communicated in a suciently clear and credible manner to the population at 
large.13 In particular, every eort should be made to reach out to those who are aected 
11 The bestseller by Gladwell (2000) explores various determinants of change.
12 See, for example, the approach suggested by Aaron (1973) as regards welfare reform in the United States.
13 The adoption of Chile’s defined-contribution public pension scheme would not have been possible without a system-
atic communication campaign by the minister of labour. For a discussion, see Pinera (1994).
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directly by the reform measures.14 Moreover, eective communication requires not only 
a credible message, but also credible spokesmen, including widely respected senior 
government ocials, to deliver the message.15
Summary and Conclusion
Overhaul of public nances during the post-socialist market-oriented transition has been 
a non-linear and uneven process across Central and Eastern Europe. At a technical level, 
there is broad agreement on the guiding principles of scal reform, namely on the need to 
promote allocative eciency, sustainability, fairness, eectiveness and good governance. 
From these criteria, we can derive widely acceptable design features.
However, the composition and pace of scal reform ultimately depend on the strength 
of political-economy drivers relative to obstacles to reform, in a given place and at a given 
time. On one hand, three major drivers can be identied that catalyse scal reform: regime 
change from socialist central planning to a market economy; nancial crises that hit (or are 
likely to hit) some countries; and the external anchor provided by participation in various 
international institutions, but above all by EU accession and by adoption of the euro. On 
the other hand, there are four major inter-related impediments to reform: the dependency 
syndrome, inherited from the socialist regime; the common-pool problem, whereby key 
interest groups seek to preserve their privileges regardless of the scal consequences; a zero-
sum game among political parties; and fear of change, especially in ageing populations.
If the drivers outweigh the impediments, reforms have a good chance of being 
implemented. But ultimately scal reforms are more likely to succeed (and less likely to be 
reversed) if they are technically well designed, based on broad consensus, and communicated 
eectively and credibly.
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